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Abstract
Bundling and non-linear pricing are popular price-discrimination techniques for offering
paid content products. In this paper we analyze the different kinds of non-linear pricing
strategies that are observable in the paid content market and the relationship between
non-linear pricing and bundling. Another goal of our empirical analysis is to show
which design of non-linear pricing leads to a high demand for large bundles, thus
maximising revenues and profits.
Our results show that companies maximize their profits with non-linear priced paid
content products only if the bundles or pricing schemes are designed correctly in order to
induce consumers to increase purchasing activity. This should be done by concentrating
on the quantity provided to the consumers, as consumers seem to respond more to a
change in quantity than to a reduction in the price. As the marginal cost of digital content
or services is generally small or even zero, increasing quantity at a lower price per unit is
a feasible strategy.
Keywords: non-linear pricing, bundling, block tariffs, paid content, information goods

1.

Introduction

In electronic markets digital information goods were distributed free to consumers for
many years. Content providers achieved their revenues through advertisement. After the
consolidation of the Internet boom in 2001 and the decline of advertisement revenues
many companies changed their business models and started to sell information goods 1
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goods which had been available for free until then. This change in content providers
strategy required a change in consumer behaviour, as consumers were now requested to
pay for digital content, instead of receiving it for free.
Paid content products are a special form of information goods ((Shapiro & Varian, 1999);
(Varian, 1998), (Clarke, 2000); (Brandtweiner, 2000)) and are counted among digital
products ((Whinston, Stahl, & Choi, 1997); Clarke, 2000; Brandtweiner, 2000:37).
Shapiro and Varian (1999: 3) define the term information good very broadly:
"Essentially, anything that can be digitised - encoded as a stream of bits - is information.
[....] Baseball scores, books, databases, magazines, movies, music, stock quotes, and Web
pages are all information goods" (Shapiro, Varian 1999:3). Based on the definition
provided by Whinston et al. (1997:61 f.) anything that can be send or received over the
Internet has the potential to be a digital product: "Information is a primary example of a
digital product, for example knowledge-based goods that can be digitised and transferred
over a digital network" (Whinston et al. 1997:61 f). In this paper the term paid content is
used as the non-free sale and distribution of information-based content products.
According to Varian (1998), information goods have three main properties that would
seem to present difficulties in market transactions: (i) information goods are experience
goods (“You must experience an information good before you know what it is”) (ii) they
have economies of scale (“Information typically has a high fixed cost of production but a
low marginal cost of reproduction”) and (iii) they have the characteristics of public goods
(“Information goods are typically non-rival and sometimes nonexcludable”) (Varian,
1998).
Therefore in order to sell information goods as paid content it is essential to develop
strategies to eliminate these market transaction difficulties. Especially due to the paid
content’s zero or near zero marginal cost characteristic the paid content market structure
is not competitive and suppliers are likely to gain market power, sometimes acquiring a
natural monopoly. This market power enables suppliers to discriminate (Varian, 2001)
among consumers, according to their willingness to pay by using price discrimination
techniques.
Non-linear pricing is a popular price-discrimination technique (Sundararajan, 2003) and
has been analysed extensively in the context of electricity and long-distance telephone
markets (Wilson, 1993). Sundararajan (2002) shows that in information markets firms are
most likely to profit from low pay per click pricing, “but as these markets mature, the
optimal pricing mix should include a wider range of usage-based pricing options”
(Sundararajan 2002).
1.1

Research Questions

This leads to the following research questions: Which kind of non-linear pricing is
observable in the paid content market? Which relationship exists between non-linear
pricing and bundling? Which non-linear pricing strategy leads to a high demand for large
bundles, which will maximise revenues and profits?
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview of the literature to
non-linear pricing and bundling theories. Based on these theories, we examine the nonlinear pricing behaviour of suppliers and consumers’ purchasing behaviour using a new
set of empiric data. In the final section we discuss the impact of our empirical findings on
existing theories and the implications of these empirical findings.
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2.

Related Literature

Non-linear pricing has been discussed extensively. As a generic term, it refers to any case
where a tariff is not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased (Wilson 1993:4). A
two-part tariff is the simplest example of a non-linear tariff, in which the customer pays
an initial fixed fee for the first unit (often justified as a subscription, access, or installation
charge) plus a smaller constant price for each additional unit. According to Wilson
(1993:5) the term non-linear pricing is usually restricted to tariffs that are offered on the
same terms to all customers. Thus, each customer pays the same marginal price. Several
kinds of non-linear tariffs are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Several kinds of non-linear tariffs (source Whinston 1993:5)

In the following the most relevant articles and approaches to non-linear pricing will be
presented chronologically.
Oi (1971) considers a profit-maximizing Disneyland monopoly which sets prices for
admission to the park and for individual rides. The park`s costs are assumed to vary only
with the number of rides taken, while households derive utility only from rides, not from
being in the park. If all households were identical, the optimal policy would be to sell
rides at marginal cost and to set the admission fee so as to convert all the consumers’
surplus into profit (Schmalensee, 1981). Therefore Oi (1971), Feldstein (1972) and Ng
and Weisser (1974) have examined optimal two-part-pricing policies.
Schmalensee (1981) presented the implications of customer diversity and other market
attributes for optimal pricing policies of two-part pricing arrangements. He also compares
the welfare properties of single-price and two-part tariff monopoly equilibria and
discusses the potential welfare gains from tying contracts.

3

Florian Stahl, Fabian Siegel

Goldman et al. (1984) consider optimal non-uniform pricing schedules, where the price
depends upon the quantity purchased. They characterize situations in which upward or
downward discontinuities in pricing schedules are optimal.
Wilson (1993) shows that in constructing a non-linear tariff for a profit-maximizing
monopoly firm the customers demand profile is used, because the advantages of nonlinear pricing stem from consumer heterogenity. For a profit-maximizing firm, the
schedule of marginal prices is derived by optimising the price charged for each increment
in the purchase size. With modifications, this principle applies also to access fees and
multipart tariffs (Wilson 1993:19).
According to Armstrong (1996) the main results of previous work on the single-product
non-linear pricing have been (i) discovering ways to solve the optimal tariff question; (ii)
showing that in many cases the firm will wish to differentiate fully among its customers,
so that customers with different tastes buy different quantities; (iii) showing that those
customers with the strongest preferences for a particular good are served efficiently, with
others being served smaller quantities than would be efficient in a world with full
information, and (iv) showing that in many cases it is optimal for the firm to offer
quantity discounts, so that the marginal price for a unit of the good decreases with the
total quantity purchased. Armstrong (1996) analyses the multiproduct non-linear pricing
problem. The results presented show that in a wide variety of situations the firm found it
optimal to exclude some low-demand consumers from the market. He also derives a class
of cases that allow an explicit solution by using a multivariate form of “integration by
parts”.
The work most closely related to our research is an article by Sundararajan (2002), in
which he analyses optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information,
when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible. He
shows formal, that the optimal usage-based pricing schedule is independent of the value
of the fixed-fee. He also presents a procedure for determining the optimal combination of
fixed-fee and non-linear usage-based contracts. In contrast to Wilson (1993) whose
findings show under similar assumptions that the optimal monopoly pricing structure is
purely usage-based, Sundararajan (2002) incorporates administration costs (e.g. for
monitoring usage, billing …) and shows that when there are no marginal production costs
from additional usage, a purely usage-based pricing scheme is not optimal.

3.

Non-linear Pricing through Bundling and Block Tarifs

Though technically possible, selling digital products separately is not always a profitmaximising strategy. Bundling, which is a special form of price discrimination, can be a
more efficient way to sell digital products. According to Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999),
the reason for that can be derived graphically from a standard demand function.

4
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Figure 2:
Using a standard one product demand function, the consumer surplus and the deadweight
loss can be easily derived. The deadweight loss could be avoided only if the price were
set equal to marginal cost, which is, as already described not optimal or even feasible in a
market for digital goods with prices near or equal zero. Any price set above the marginal
cost, however, creates a deadweight loss.

Figure 3:
Bundling provides a way of solving this dilemma. Looking at the demand function for a
two product bundle, with each of the products being valued independently by consumers
on a scale from [0;1] e.g. setting the price accordingly, the following effect on the
demand curve can be observed. The bundle of the two goods is being valued on a scale of
[0;2]. The area below the combined demand curve equals the two areas below each of the
single product demand curves, but the slope changes, being more elastic around the
median and less elastic at each end of the interval. Adding more products to this bundle
expands this effect, as can be seen in a 20 product bundle demand curve. With more
products being added to the bundle, the median utility for consumers is concentrated
around the median price of the bundle. An optimal pricing strategy can be derived from
this effect, which is described in detail by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), who show that
the profit derived from bundling diverse goods grows the bigger a bundle is, because “the
law of large numbers assures that the distribution for the valuation of the bundle has an
increasing fraction of consumers with “moderate” valuations near the mean of the
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underlying distribution, […] the demand curve becomes more elastic near the mean and
less elastic away from the mean” (Bakos, Brynjolfsson 1999:5).
An alternative view is provided by Wilson (1993), who construes non-linear pricing as an
instance of bundling, if products are non-diverse. “Products are said to be bundled if the
charge for a purchase of several products in combination is less than the sum of the
charges for the components. Bundling applies to products that are diverse, but if the
“products” are units of the same generic commodity then the effect is the same as nonlinear pricing. That is, for a bundle of two units a customer is charged less than twice the
charge for a single unit” (Wilson 1993:88).
Bundling therefore enables merchants to optimise their pricing strategies in order to
maximise profits. Adding more products to a bundle simplifies setting the optimal price,
overcoming problems of imperfect information on consumer preferences.
Furthermore the bundling approach can be compared with a block-tariff and block
pricing, where the price per unit declines with the quantity purchased by a particular
customer (quantity discounts). An example of a block tariff is illustrated in Figure 4.
According to Klein and Loebbecke (1999), block pricing and quantity discounts tend to
result in greater revenues, because heavy users pay prices which are closer to marginal
cost. “However, it does not convert all consumer surplus into profit like it is the case with
perfect personalization, where the number of blocks would equal the number of
customers” (Klein, Loebecke 1999).

Price/
Unit

q1

q2

q3

# unites

Figure 4: Block Tariff

Shapiro and Varian (1998) illustrate the relation between the bundling approach and nonlinear pricing considering music songs as an example, where the first song would cost
$1.20 and each additional song would cost $1. Under this price system two heterogeneous
consumers with different musical tastes would choose two songs and the supplier would
end up with $4.40, just as if the supplier had bundled the products. “This example shows
6
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that quantity discounts can play the same role as bundling. In fact, quantity discounts can
be thought of as a generalized form of bundling and are useful for much the same reasons
that bundling is useful” (Shapiro, Varian 1998:78).
According to theory, bundling reduces the variations in heterogeneous consumers’
willingness to pay. The aggregation of complementary goods can increase suppliers’
revenues if (through the aggregation) the variation across customers in their willingness
to pay decreases. Non-linear pricing can also be used to allow consumers to build their
own bundles. As bundling quantity discounts can increase usage and revenue at the same
time (Shapiro, Varian 1998:81).
Empirical evidence about non-linear pricing and the increase of usage and revenues was
shown in a report on the PEAK Experiment. MacKie-Mason et al. (1999) show that
institutions that could purchase generalized subscription tokens tended to purchase more
tokens than they needed to cover all demand for articles by their users; i.e., they didn't
run out of tokens. This means, that institutions purchased more tokens at a lower price per
token than they needed, because bigger bundles are relatively cheaper (because of the
quantity discount). It is cheaper for institutions to purchase biggers quantities of tokens to
reduce the risk of having to purchase additional access on a per-article basis.
Reflecting these theoretical approaches, bundling and non-linear pricing is strongly
interrelated. Both, bundling as a device of product differentiation and non-linear pricing
as an instrument for price differentiation have the goal of skimming consumer surplus.
Based on the model established by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Wilson’s (1993)
observations the following hypothesis can be derived: Suppliers of paid content products
should design non-linear block tariffs so that consumers choose larger bundles more
frequently than smaller bundles - analogous to bundling theories.

4.

Empirical Analysis of Non-Linear Pricing of Paid Content

In the paid content market non-linear pricing is mostly implemented in the form of block
tariffs, using parameters such as time, number of coins or quantity of products (e.g. the
number of SMS). Block tariffs in the paid content market are provided for example by
suppliers who use subscription pricing models and offer their users one month, six
months and twelve months subscriptions, with a decreasing price per month for each
subscription segment.
The following section presents the results of a quantitative analysis, in which the block
tariffs of more than 50 suppliers of paid content were analysed.
4.1

Data

The hypotheses for non-linear pricing of paid content on electronic markets were tested
on a set of data from the German payment provider FIRSTGATE, which is the leading
micropayment provider in Germany, with 2500 suppliers of paid content and paid
services and 2.5 million registered users.
A sub sample of 55 suppliers was drawn for the empirical analysis. The criteria for the
selection of suppliers was based on the requirement that each supplier priced their paid
content products with a non-linear block tariff.
This sub sample consist of 352´460 purchase transactions made by 161´750 customers in
the period January 2003 to December 2003, representing all the suppliers purchase
transactions in the given period.
7
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4.2

Methodology and Results

Analysis of the data was performed in several steps. First, we computed the absolute and
relative distribution of the number of suppliers according to the chosen number of
segments of the non-linear block tariff. Based on this distribution, the percentage of
suppliers with increasing and decreasing number of purchase transactions in higher price
quantity segments was calculated.
Table 1 shows that more than 50% of the suppliers chose a non-linear block tariff with
three segments. Only 20% of the suppliers had designed their tariff with more than 3
segments. Table 2 also shows only 28% of the suppliers are experiencing higher number
of purchase transactions for the high price quantity segments then for the loweprice
segments. This means that for two thirds of the suppliers the non-linear block tariffs are
designed in such a way that most of the consumers choose the smallest quantity with the
highest price per unit.
Table 1: Distribution of the number of suppliers according the choosen number of
segments
Supplier’s
number of
segments

Number of Number of
Suppliers Suppliers
(absolut)
(relative)

Percentage of suppliers with Percentage of suppliers with
increasing number of
decreasing number of
purchase transactions in
purchase transactions in
higher price-quantity
higher price-quantity
segments
segments

2 segments

16

29.09

0.250

0.750

3 segments

28

50.91

0.222

0.777

4 segments

7

12.73

0.429

0.571

5 segments

4

3.64

0.250

0.750

0.288

0.712

Average

Table 2 shows the distribution of the most frequently demanded segments of the nonlinear block tariffs among the suppliers observed. The values show that only a few
suppliers design their block tariffs in such a way, that most consumers would choose the
biggest quantity or bundle with the smallest price per unit. The tariffs of most of the
suppliers induce the consumer to choose the smallest quantity or bundle with the highest
price per unit.
Table 2: Segments with the most purchase transactions
(smallest quantity Supplier’s number highest price per unit)
of segments
1
2

(biggest quantity smallest price per unit)
3

4

2 segments

12

4

3 segments

21

5

1

4 segments

3

3

0

1

5 segments

1

2

1

0

5

0

In order to analyse the reason for this consumer behaviour, we computed the difference of
the price per unit between two tariff segments that featured higher resp. lower purchases
8
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for higher price segments. The percentage quotation in Table 3 shows that suppliers with
high numbers of purchase transactions in higher price-quantity segments reduce the price
per unit between two price segments (-38% on the average) much more than suppliers
with small numbers of purchase transactions in higher price-quantity segments (-16,3%
on the average). The difference between the price-cutting per unit by suppliers featuring
high purchase figures and that by suppliers with low purchase figures in the last column
of Table 4 shows that a reduction of an additional 21.7% in prices leads to an increasing
demand for high priced segments. Hence, consumers seem to be attracted to buying larger
quantities only if the reduction in price per unit is substantial.
Table 3: Influence of price-per-unit alteration on demand behaviour at non-linear tariffs

Supplier’s
number of
segments

Difference of the
Percentage relative alteration
Percentage of relative alteration price-cutting per
of suppliers of the price per
suppliers with
of the price per
unit between
with an
unit between two
an decreasing unit between two
suppliers with
increasing
tariff segments
number of
tariff segments
increasing and
number of
with an
purchase
with an decreasing suppliers with
purchase
increasing
number of
transactions in
decreasing
transactions
number of
higher
purchase
number of
in higher
purchase
segments
transactions
purchase
segments
transactions
transactions

2 segments

25.0%

-56.1%

75.0%

-34.2%

21.8%

3 segments

22.2%

-27.2%

77.7%

-15.7%

11.5%

4 segments

42.9%

-13.6%

57.1%

-7.5%

6.1%

5 segments

25.0%

-55.3%

75.0%

-8.0%

47.3%

Average

28.8%

-38.0%

71.2%

-16.3%

21.7%

For a detailed analysis of consumer reaction to the diffent price segments offered we
calculated the difference in quantity provided and the difference in price between two
price segments. These values show the influence of the relative change of the quantity
and the influence of the relative change of the price on the number of purchase
transactions between two segments.
Table 4:
Relative alteration of
the quantity between
two segments
(average)

Relative alteration of
the price between
two segments
(average)

Relative alteration of
the price per unit
between two
segments (average)

Decreasing number of
purchase transaction
between two segments

4.96

2.96

0.83

Increasing number of
purchase transaction
between two segments

7.77

2.38

0.66

Table 4 shows that for high priced segments with a weak consumer adoption rate the
quantity or the bundle size increases by a factor of 4,96 compared to the lower priced
segment offered. For segments featuring a strong consumer adoption rate, the quantity or
the bundle size increases by a factor of 7,77 compared to the lower priced segment
9
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offered. In comparison, the change in price between two segments is on the average much
smaller. For segments with a weak consumer adoption rate the price rises by a factor of
2,96 compared to the lower priced segment offered. For segments with strong consumer
adoption rate, prices increased by a factor of 2,38 compared to the lower priced segment
offered.
The difference in the change of quantity and the change in price between price segments
shows that the change in price has less influence on the consumers buying decision than
the change in quantity. Therefore the consumers’ choice depends more on the change of
quantity between two bundles than on the change of price between two bundles. This
result is important, as the marginal cost of paid content is near zero.
For analysing the direction and magnitude of the influence of changes in price and
quantity, several correlation coefficients were computed. In Table 5, the correlation
coefficients between the relative alteration of the quantity, price, price per unit, the
alteration of the quantity in comparison to the alteration of the price and the relative
change of the number of purchase transactions between two segments are listed.
Table 5 shows that the correlation coefficient between the relative change in quantity and
the difference in number of purchase transactions between two segments is positive, but
that the correlation coefficient between the relative change in price, as well as the price
per unit between two segments is negative. Therefore, a larger change in quantity
between two segments leads to an increased number of purchase transactions in high
priced segments with bigger bundles. In contrast, a larger change in price, or price per
unit, between two segments leads to a decrease in number of purchase transactions in
high priced segments with large quantities.
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients
correlation coefficient

Relative alteration of
the quantity between
two segments

Relative alteration
of the price between
two segments

Relative alteration of
the price per unit
between two segments

Relative change of
the number of
purchase transactions

0.1491

-0.0290

-0.0804

In order to analyse the significance of these relationships an ANOVA was computed. The
“Analysis of Variance” is a method, which analyses the effect of one or several
independent variables (e.g. the relative alteration of the quantity or price between two
segments) in relation to one dependent variable (e.g. relative change of the number of
purchase transactions) (Backhaus, Erichson, & Plinke, 2003). In order to analyse the
impact of the relative change in quantity or price or price per unit between two segments
on the dependent variable (relative change in the number of purchase transactions) we
computed a one-way ANOVA. The results are presented in Table 6 to Table 9 in
Appendix 1.
As shown in Table 7 and Table 8 a highly significant influence of the relative alteration
of quantity and price on the relative change of the number of purchase transactions can be
identified. The model was applied to 107 observations (see Table 7 and Table 8) and the
R² of the model is more than 0.6, which is an indicator for high significance.
In Table 9 an even more significant influence of the type of bundling on revenue could be
identified (R² = 0.99). These statistics fully support the hypothesis that the relative change
in quantity between two segments is positive and that the relative alteration of the price
10
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and price per unit between two segments is negative correlated in relation to changes of
the number of purchase transactions in high priced segments.
To answer the research question not only the influence, but also the kind, of interrelation
is of interest. The kind of interrelation was analysed by a multiple non-linear regression,
which helps to analyse the influence of the relative alteration of the quantity, price and
price per unit between two segments, as well as the influence of the number of tarif
segments on the relative alteration in the number of purchase transactions between two
segments. The multiple regression fits a model of a dependent variable on a list of
independent variables. In our case the dependend variable is the relative change in the
number of purchase transactions and the independent variables are the relative change of
the quantity, price and price per unit between two segments and the number of tarif
segments.
The multiple regression shows that a quadratic regression model fits the interrelation of
the dependent and independent variables best:
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X12 + β3X2 + ε

Y is the relative alteration in the number of purchase transactions, X1 is the relative
alteration of the quantity, price and price per unit and X2 the number of tarif segments.
Table 9 to Table 11 show the results of the multiple regression analysis. The significance
of the regression analysis differs explicitly in Tabel 9, Table 10 and Table 11. The
quadratic interrelation between the relative change in the number of purchase transactions
and the relative change in the quantity is highly significant (R² = 0.92). But the
significance of the quadratic model regression with the relative change in the price is
rather low (R² = 0.11). Between the relative change in the number of purchase
transactions and the relative change of the price there is no quadratic or linear relation
observable.
The quadratic coefficient in Table 9 shows that the number of purchase transactions
grows disproportionately to the change in the quantity between two segments. This means
for non-linear pricing of Paid Content that the change in quantity between two tarif
segments leads to a disproportionately higher demand in the segment with the larger
bundle. This result verifies the result in Table 4.
In the following section the empirical results will be discussed in the context of the
hypothesis and the theoretical approaches.

5.

Discussion and Implications

According to the bundling interpretation of non-linear pricing (Wilson 1993:88) - who
construes non-linear pricing as a form of bundling if products are non-diverse – our
hypothesis stated that suppliers of paid content products should design non-linear block
tariffs in such a way that consumers choose larger bundles more frequently than smaller
bundles - complying to standard bundling theory. Buth the results in the previous section
show that most consumers choose the bundle with the smallest quantity and the highest
price per unit. Only a minority of the suppliers design their non-linear block tariff in a
way that creates stronger demand for high priced bundles with larger quantities than for
low priced bundles with smaller quantities. Therefor the current behaviour of the majority
of suppliers does not comply with our hypothesis. However we were able to identify
consumer behaviour that is compliant to bundling and pricing theory we referred to in the
beginning of this article. In order to answer the research question about the optimal
11
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design of non-linear pricing leading to a high demand of large bundles, thus maximising
revenue and profit, we analyzed the interrelationship of demand for non-linear priced paid
content goods and the price per unit. Using our set of data, we were able to identify the
following relationship between change in quantity and price for bundles:
•

The larger the increase in size of the bundle between two segments the stronger the
demand and the number of purchase transactions for high priced segments

•

The smaller the increase in price and price per unit between two segments the
stronger the demand and the number of purchase transactions in high priced
segments

•

Block tariffs that are successfully inducing consumers to buy high prices segments
feature a strong change in quantity but rather a minor increase in price. In fact, the
change in price seems to be have only little effect on the consumer descision.. The
demand increases for higher priced segments if the bundle size grows by more than a
factor of seven (on the average) between two segments. In general, the demand and
the number of purchase transactions in a segment depend more on the change of the
quantity and less on the change of the price.

•

Increases in demand and purchase transactions in high priced segments with block
tariffs is positively correlated with the total number segments offered by the supplier.

Therefore, only when the design of a non-linear block tariff is focusing on changes in
quantity between two segments consumers choose larger bundles more frequently than
smaller bundles. This is compliant to bundling theories. Because of the marginal cost
characteristics of digital paid content products increasing the quantity in the block tariff
should result in higher demand for high priced segments (but lower prices per unit),
which seems to be profit maximising.
As presented in this paper from a theoretical point of view, bundling and non-linear
pricing are closely related. The purpose of bundling, as well as that of non-linear block
pricing, is to skim consumer surplus. But the empirical results in the last section show
that “the law of large numbers” does not apply for non-linear pricing in the same way as
for bundling. The differences in consumer behaviour can be explained by differences
between the two price differentiation methods (Brandweiner 2001:109; Simon 1992):
• A strong prerequisite for the application of bundling as a pricing method is the
heterogeneity of the demand. Non-linear pricing is also applicable if the demand is
homogeneous
• Bundling is mainly applicable for consumers’ “buy / not buy” decisions. Bundling of
paid content products leads to an increase in “buy” decisions compared to when digital
products are sold separately. Non-linear (block tariff) pricing has a minor influence on
these “buy / not buy” decisions.
• In contrast, non-linear (block tariff) pricing is mainly applicable to the “quantitydecision” of consumers. Non-linear pricing influences what quantity of the products a
consumer will purchase and not the general “buy / not buy” decisions.

In addition to bundling theory, another possible interpretation of the consumer behaviour
examined, presented in the previous section’s empirical analysis, could be derived from
investment theories, especially option-pricing theories. In most cases, consumers do not
use the whole bundle of digital paid content immediately after purchase; usage is
distributed over future periods. Thus, from a consumers perspective, buying the bundle is
an investment associated with uncertainty. This uncertainty grows with both the amount
to be paid and the quantity of the bundle. The consumers’ decision to choose a larger
12
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bundle comprises a trade-off between flexibility to spend the money alternatively and the
economic potential to save on a per unit basis. Therefore, by consuming a smaller bundle
the consumer gets the option and flexibility to consume a smaller quantity and spend
money on other goods instead. According to option theories, the difference in price per
unit between two segments is equivalent to the price which the consumer pays for
flexibility for future consumption. The higher the difference in the number of purchase
transactions and the difference in the prices per unit between two segments, the higher is
the influence of the consumers risk aversion and thus the higher is the willingness to pay
for flexibility. The relative change of the price per unit between two segments in Table 5
shows that consumers prefer smaller bundles with higher prices per unit and thus higher
flexibility in their future spending descision if the (average) reduction of the price per unit
is 17% between two segments. But if the supplier cuts prices per unit by 44%, consumers
choose larger bundles and sacrifice flexibility in favor of saving costs. These results show
that consumers are rather risk averse when it comes to digital contents or services.

6.

Conclusions

We showed that companies are able to maximize profits when selling digital content or
services by providing different bundles to consumers or appyling non-linear pricing
schemes. However, these bundles or pricing schemes need to designed correctly in order
to induce consumers to increase their spendings. This should be done by concentrating on
the quantity provided to the consumer, as the consumer seems to respond more to a
change in quantity than a reduction in the per-unit-price. As marginal costs of digital
contents or services is generally small or even zero, increasing quantity at a lower perunit-price is a feasible strategy.
We showed as well that only few of the suppliers we examined follow our proposed
strategy. They should therefore redesign their paid content and service offer according to
present pricing theory.
For future research, option pricing theories should be applied for further analysis of the
paid content and service market.
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Appendix 1

Table 6: Anova: Impact of the quantity-changes on the change of the number of
transactions
Number of observations = 107

R-squared

Root MSE

Adj R-squared = 0.3847

= 6.1456

Source

= 0.6053

Partial SS

Df

MS

F

Prob > F

Model

3938.75136

38

103.651352

2.74

0.0001

Quantity-changes

3938.75136

38

103.651352

2.74

0.0001

Residual

2568.25503

68

37.7684563

Total

6507.00639

106

61.3868527

Table 7: Anova: Impact of the price-changes on the change of the number of transactions
Number of observations = 107

R-squared

Root MSE

Adj R-squared = -0.3219

= 9.00829

= 0.6134

Source

Partial SS

Df

MS

F

Prob > F

Model

3991.38122

75

53.2184162

0.66

0.9291

Price-change

3991.38122

75

53.2184162

0.66

0.9291

Residual

2515.62517

31

81.1491991

Total

6507.00639

106

61.3868527
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Table 8: Anova: Impact of the price-per-unit-changes on the change of the number of
transactions
Number of observations = 107

R-squared

Root MSE

Adj R-squared = 0.9680

= 1.43343

= 0.9915

Source

Partial SS

Df

MS

F

Prob > F

Model

6436.82326

74

86.9840981

42.33

0.0000

Price-per-unit-change

6436.82326

74

86.9840981

42.33

0.0000

Residual

55.477358

27

2.05471696

Total

6492.30062

101

64.2802042

Appendix 2

Table 9: Regression analysis: dependency of the change of the number of purchase

transactions on the quantity changes
Source

SS

df

MS

Number of obs.

=

107

Model

1553.141

3

517.71
3

F(3, 103)

=

400.69

Prob > F

=

0.0000

1.2920
5

R-squared

=

0.9275

Adj R-squared

=

0.9252

Root MSE

=

1.1367

Residual

121.4527

103

Total

1674.594

106

17.263

change of
the number
of purchase
transactions

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

Quantitychanges

0.0149078

0.013073

1.14

0.257

-0.01104

0.0408647

Quantitychanges ²

0.000047

0.000017

2.79

0.006

0.00001

0.0000804

Segment

0.1765785

0.149894

1.18

0.242

-0.12104

0.4741984

_cons

0.2768845

0.438635

0.63

0.529

-0.59403

1.147806
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Table 10: Regression analysis: dependency of the change of the number of purchase
transactions on the price changes
Source

SS

df

MS

Number of obs.

=

107

=

3.95

Model

6.7655

3

2.2551

F(3, 103)

Residual

53.063

103

0.5705
8

Prob > F

=

0.0106

R-squared

=

0.1131

Total

45.420

106

0.
62322

Adj R-squared

=

0.0845

Root MSE

=

0.75537

change of
the number
of purchase
transactions

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

price
change

-0.428464

0.16655

-2.57

0.012

-0.759214

-0.097713

price
change ²

0.0267642

0.01316

2.03

0.045

0.0006

0.052898

Segment

0.012684

0.09621

0.13

0.895

-0.178374

0.203742

_cons

1.44060

0.42998

3.35

0.001

0.586736

2.2944

Table 11: Regression analysis: dependency of the change of the number of purchase

transactions on the price-per-unit-changes
Source

SS

df

MS

Number of obs.

=

107

=

13.24

Model

14.013

3

4.6711

F(3, 103)

Residual

31.4068

103

0.35288

Prob > F

=

0.0000

Total

45.420

106

0.4937

R-squared

=

0.3085

Adj R-squared

=

0.2852

Root MSE

=

.59404

change of
the number
of purchase
transactions

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

price-perunit-change

-2.771

0.56143

-4.94

0.000

-3.88

-1.6557

price-perunit-change
²

0.8604

0.29725

2.89

0.005

0.2698

1.4510

Segment

0.0824

0.0781

1.06

0.294

-0.0727

0.23768

_cons

2.0593

0.3048

6.75

0.000

1.4535

2.6651
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